In this paper we propose auction algorithms for solving several types of assignment problems with inequality constraints. Included are asymmetric problems with different numbers of persons and objects, and multiassignment problems, where persons may be assigned to several objects and reversely. A central new idea in all these algorithms is to combine regular auction, where persons bid for objects by raising their prices, with reverse auction, where objects compete for persons by essentially offering discounts. Reverse auction can also be used to accelerate substantially (and sometimes dramatically) the convergence of regular auction for symmetric assignment problems.
INTRODUCTION
Let us consider the classical symmetric assignment problem where we want to match n persons and n objects on a one-to-one basis. The benefit for matching a person with an object is given, and we want to assign all persons to distinct objects so as to maximize the total benefit. The auction algorithm is a method for solving this problem that was first proposed in [Ber79] , and was subsequently developed in [Ber85] , [Ber88] , and [BeE88] . It operates like a real-life auction. There is a price for each object, and at each iteration, unassigned persons bid simultaneously for their "best" objects (the ones offering maximum benefit minus price), thereby raising the corresponding prices.
Objects are then awarded to the highest bidder. The bidding increments must be at least equal to a positive parameter , and are chosen so as to preserve an -complementary slackness property.
For good theoretical as well as practical performance, it may be important to use -scaling, which consists of applying the algorithm several times, starting with a large value of and successively reducing up to an ultimate value that is less than some threshold (1/n when a ij are integer). Each scaling phase provides good initial prices for the next. For tutorial presentations of the auction algorithm, we refer to [Ber90] and [Ber91] .
We note that there are several extensions of the auction algorithm; to transportation problems [BeC89a] , and to minimum cost flow problems (the -relaxation method of [Ber86a] and [Ber86b] , and the network auction algorithm of [BeC89b] ). Computational studies on serial and parallel machines [BeC89b] , [BeC89c] , [CSW89] , [Cas92] , [KKZ89] , [PhZ88] , [WeZ90] , [WeZ91] , [Zak90] have shown that the algorithm is very effective, particularly for sparse symmetric assignment problems and special types of transportation problems.
In this paper we consider several new extensions of the auction algorithm for variations of the assignment problem described above. For some of these problems, no effective adaptation of the auction algorithm has been known so far, while for other problems, including the symmetric assignment problem, the ideas of this paper have resulted in auction algorithms with substantially improved performance over the ones previously known.
Central to the present paper is an alternative form of the auction algorithm, called reverse auction, where, roughly, the objects compete for persons by lowering their prices. In particular, objects decrease their prices to a level that is sufficiently low to lure a person away from its currently held object. One can show that forward and reverse auctions are mathematically equivalent, but their combination results in algorithms that can solve problems that forward or reverse auction by themselves either cannot solve at all or can solve but much more slowly.
Reverse Auction for Symmetric Assignment Problems
In the next section, we show how to combine forward and reverse auction to solve symmetric assignment problems. In particular we provide mechanisms for switching gracefully between the two types of auction, using a special type of -complementary slackness condition. As shown by computational results given in Section 5, the combined forward/reverse method outperforms substantially the regular (forward) method. The reason appears to be that the combined method suffers much less from "price wars", that is, protracted bid sequences involving a small number of persons competing for a smaller number of objects using small bidding increments. In fact, it may not be necessary to resort to -scaling, involving the solution of several subproblems, to improve the performance of the method.
In Section 3, we consider asymmetric assignment problems, where the number of persons is less than the number of objects. As a result, in a feasible assignment, we require that every person but not necessarily every object be assigned. The original paper on the auction algorithm [Ber79] showed that this problem can be solved by the auction algorithm provided the prices of all objects start at zero. This approach is often very effective in practice, particularly when the number of persons is much less than the number of objects, but unfortunately precludes the use of -scaling.
As a result, it is ineffective for problems where price wars are likely to arise. By suitably combining forward and reverse auction, we eliminate this drawback. In particular, we give a new auction algorithm for solving the asymmetric assignment problem, where the starting object prices can be arbitrary, so that -scaling can be used in the same way as for symmetric problems.
In Section 4, we consider an interesting class of assignment-like problems, called multiassignment problems, which arise in multitarget tracking applications (see the comments of Section 4). There are no specialized network flow methods that can solve these problems at present, although they can be solved by general purpose network methods such as primal-simplex, primal-dual, or relaxation methods. We develop new classes of auction algorithms for multiassignment problems, by combining the ideas of forward and reverse auctions.
Finally, in Section 5, we present computational results using various experimental codes implementing the new algorithms of this paper. For each of the problems considered (symmetric and asymmetric assignment, and two types of multiassignment problems), we show that the new methods of this paper outperform substantially (and often dramatically) current state-of-the-art codes.
REVERSE AUCTION FOR SYMMETRIC ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS
In the symmetric assignment problem there are n persons and n objects. The benefit or value 2. Reverse Auction for Symmetric Assignment Problems for assigning person i to object j is a ij . The set of objects to which person i can be assigned is a nonempty set denoted A(i). An assignment S is a (possibly empty) set of person-object pairs (i, j) such that j ∈ A(i) for all (i, j) ∈ S; for each person i there can be at most one pair (i, j) ∈ S; and for every object j there can be at most one pair (i, j) ∈ S. Given an assignment S, we say that person i is assigned if there exists a pair (i, j) ∈ S; otherwise we say that i is unassigned. We use similar terminology for objects. An assignment is said to be feasible if it contains n pairs, so that every person and every object is assigned; otherwise the assignment is called partial . We want to find an assignment (1, j 1 ), . . . , (n, j n ) with maximum total benefit n i=1 a ij j .
The auction algorithm for the symmetric assignment problem proceeds iteratively and terminates when a feasible assignment is obtained. At the start of the generic iteration we have a partial assignment S and a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) satisfying -complementary slackness (or -CS for short). This is the condition
As an initial choice, one can use an arbitrary set of prices together with the empty assignment, which trivially satisfies -CS. The iteration consists of two phases: the bidding phase and the assignment phase described in the following.
Bidding Phase:
Let I be a nonempty subset of persons i that are unassigned under the assignment S. For each person i ∈ I:
1. Find a "best" object ji having maximum value, that is,
and the corresponding value
and find the best value offered by objects other than ji wi = max
[If ji is the only object in A(i), we define wi to be −∞ or, for computational purposes, a number that is much smaller than vi.]
2. Compute the "bid" of person i given by
[We characterize this situation by saying that person i bid for object ji, and that object ji received a bid from person i. The algorithm works if the bid has any value between pj i + and pj i + vi − wi + , but it tends to work fastest for the maximal choice of Eq. (4).]
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Assignment Phase:
For each object j:
Let P (j) be the set of persons from which j received a bid in the bidding phase of the iteration. If P (j)
is nonempty, increase pj to the highest bid:
remove from the assignment S any pair (i, j) (if j was assigned to some i under S), and add to S the pair (ij , j), where ij is a person in P (j) attaining the maximum above.
Note that there is some freedom in choosing the subset of persons I that bid during an iteration.
One possibility is to let I consist of a single unassigned person. This version, known as the GaussSeidel version in view of its similarity with Gauss-Seidel methods for solving systems of nonlinear equations, usually works best in a serial computing environment. The version where I consists of all unassigned persons is the most well suited for parallel computation, and is known as the Jacobi version, in view of its similarity with Jacobi methods for solving systems of nonlinear equations.
The choice of bidding increment vi −wi+ for a person i [cf. Eq. (4)] is such that -CS is preserved, as stated in the following well known proposition.
Proposition 1:
The auction algorithm preserves -CS throughout its execution, that is, if the assignment and price vector available at the start of an iteration satisfy -CS, the same is true for the assignment and price vector obtained at the end of the iteration.
Proof: See [Ber79] or [Ber88] or [BeT89] or [Ber91] .
Furthermore, the algorithm is valid in the sense stated below.
Proposition 2:
If at least one feasible assignment exists, the auction algorithm terminates in a finite number of iterations with a feasible assignment that is within n of being optimal (and is optimal if the problem data is integer and < 1/n).
The auction algorithm can be shown to have an O A(n + nC/ ) worst-case running time, where
A is the number of arcs of the assignment graph, and
is the maximum absolute object value; see [Ber79] , [BeE88] , [BeT89] . Thus, the amount of work to solve the problem can depend strongly on the value of as well as C. In practice, the dependence of the running time on and C is often significant, particularly for sparse problems.
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To obtain polynomial complexity, one can use -scaling, which consists of applying the algorithm several times, starting with a large value of and successively reducing up to an ultimate value that is less than 1/n. Each application of the algorithm, called a scaling phase, provides good initial prices for the next application. For integer data, it can be shown that the worst-case running time of the auction algorithm using scaling and appropriate data structures is O nA log(nC) ; see [BeE88] , [BeT89] . We note that while -scaling was suggested in the original proposal of the auction algorithm [Ber79] , it was first analyzed in [Gol87] (see also [GoT90] ) in the context of -relaxation, the minimum cost flow algorithm proposed in [Ber86a] and [Ber86b] , which is essentially equivalent to the auction algorithm. There is not much that is known about the average complexity of the auction algorithm. However, an interesting analysis of [Sch90] suggests that for uniformly distributed arc costs its running time grows proportionally to something like A log n or A log n log(nC); this is roughly consistent with computational results using randomly generated problems.
Reverse Auction
In the auction algorithm, persons compete for objects by bidding and raising the price of their best object. It is possible to use an alternative form of the auction algorithm, called reverse auction,
where objects compete for persons. In particular, objects decrease their prices to a level that is sufficiently low to either attract an unassigned person or lure a person away from its currently held object.
In order to describe reverse auction, we introduce a profit variable π i for each person i. Profits play for persons a role analogous to the role prices play for objects. We can describe the reverse auction algorithm in two equivalent ways; one where unassigned objects lower their prices as much as possible to attract a person without violating -CS, and another where unassigned objects select a best person and raise his/her profit as much as possible without violating -CS. For analytical convenience, we will adopt the second description rather than the first.
Let us consider the following -CS condition for a (partial) assignment S and a profit vector π:
where B(j) is the set of persons that can be assigned to object j,
For feasibility, we assume that this set is nonempty for all j. Note the symmetry of this condition with the corresponding one for prices; cf. Eq. (1). The reverse auction algorithm starts with, and maintains an assignment and a profit vector π satisfying the above -CS condition. It terminates when the assignment is feasible. At the beginning of each iteration, we have an assignment S and a profit vector π satisfying the -CS condition (6).
Typical Iteration of Reverse Auction:
Let J be a nonempty subset of objects j that are unassigned under the assignment S. For each object j ∈ J:
1. Find a "best" person ij such that ij = arg max i∈B(j) {aij − πi}, and the corresponding value
and find
[If ij is the only person in B(j), we define ωj to be −∞ or, for computational purposes, a number that is much smaller than βj.]
2. Each object j ∈ J bids for person ij an amount
3. For each person i that received at least one bid, increase πi to the highest bid πi := max
where P (i) is the set of objects from which i received a bid; remove from the assignment S any pair (i, j) (if i was assigned to some j under S), and add to S the pair (i, ji), where ji is an object in P (i) attaining the maximum above.
Note that reverse auction is identical to (forward) auction with the roles of persons and objects as well as profits and prices interchanged. Thus, by using the corresponding (forward) auction result (cf. Prop. 2), we have:
Proposition 3: If at least one feasible assignment exists, the reverse auction algorithm terminates in a finite number of iterations. The feasible assignment obtained upon termination is within n of being optimal (and is optimal if the problem data are integer and < 1/n).
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Combined Forward and Reverse Auction
One of the reasons we are interested in reverse auction is to construct algorithms that switch from forward to reverse auction and back. Such algorithms must simultaneously maintain a price vector p satisfying the -CS condition (1) and a profit vector π satisfying the -CS condition (6). To this end we introduce an -CS condition for the pair (π, p), which as we will see, implies the other two. Maintaining this condition is essential for switching gracefully between forward and reverse auction.
Definition 1: An assignment S and a pair (π, p) are said to satisfy -CS if
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4:
Suppose that an assignment S together with a profit-price pair (π, p) satisfy -CS. Then:
(a) S and π satisfy the -CS condition
(b) S and p satisfy the -CS condition
(c) If S is feasible, then S is within n of being an optimal assignment.
Proof: (a) In view of Eq. (11b), for all (i, j) ∈ S, we have p j = a ij − π i , so Eq. (11a) implies that Q.E.D.
We now introduce a combined forward/reverse algorithm. The algorithm starts with, and maintains an assignment S and a profit-price pair (π, p) satisfying the -CS condition (11). It terminates when the assignment is feasible.
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Combined Forward/Reverse Auction Algorithm
Step 1: (Run forward auction) Execute several iterations of the forward auction algorithm (subject to the termination condition), and at the end of each iteration (after increasing the prices of the objects that received a bid), set
for every person-object pair (i, ji) that entered the assignment during the iteration. Go to Step 2.
Step 2: (Run reverse auction) Execute several iterations of the reverse auction algorithm (subject to the termination condition), and at the end of each iteration (after increasing the profits of the persons that received a bid), set
for every person-object pair (ij, j) that entered the assignment during the iteration. Go to Step 1.
Note that the additional overhead of the combined algorithm over the forward or the reverse algorithm is minimal; just one update of the form (14) or (15) ). An important property is that the updates of Eqs. (14) and (15) maintain the -CS condition (11) for the pair (π, p), and therefore, by Prop. 4, maintain the required -CS conditions (12) and (13) for π and p, respectively. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5:
If the assignment and profit-price pair available at the start of an iteration of either the forward or the reverse auction algorithm satisfy the -CS condition (11), the same is true for the assignment and profit-price pair obtained at the end of the iteration, provided Eq. (14) is used to update π (in the case of forward auction), and Eq. (15) is used to update p (in the case of forward auction).
Proof: Assume for concreteness that forward auction is used, and let (π, p) and (π, p) be the profit-price pair before and after the iteration, respectively. Then, p j ≥ pj for all j (with strict inequality if and only if j received a bid during the iteration). Therefore, we have
to the assignment before as well as after the iteration. Also, in view of the update (14), we have πi + p j i = aij i for all pairs (i, ji) that entered the assignment during the iteration. What remains is to verify that the condition
holds for all persons i that submitted a bid and were assigned to an object, say ji, during the iteration. Indeed for such a person i, we have by Eq. (4),
which implies that
This shows the desired relation (16). Q.E.D.
Note that during forward auction, the object prices pj increase, while the profits πi decrease, but exactly the opposite happens in reverse auction. For this reason, the termination proof used for forward auction (see e.g. [BeT89] , p. 371) does not apply to the combined method. Indeed, it is possible to construct examples of feasible problems where the combined method never terminates if the switch between forward and reverse auctions is done arbitrarily. However, it is easy to guarantee that the combined algorithm terminates finitely for a feasible problem; it is sufficient to ensure that some "irreversible progress" is made before switching between forward and reverse auction. One easily implementable possibility is to refrain from switching until at least one more person-object pair has been added to the assignment. In this way there can be a switch at most (n − 1) times between the forward and reverse steps of the algorithm. Since for a feasible problem, forward and reverse auction by themselves have guaranteed finite termination, the final step will terminate with a feasible assignment satisfying -CS.
The combined forward/reverse auction algorithm often works substantially faster than the forward version. It seems to to be affected less by "price wars", that is, protracted sequences of small price rises by a number of persons bidding for a smaller number of objects. Price wars can still occur in the combined algorithm, but they arise through more complex and unlikely problem structures than in the forward algorithm. For this reason the combined forward/reverse auction algorithm depends less on -scaling for good performance than its forward counterpart. One consequence of this is that starting with = 1/n and bypassing -scaling is often the best choice. Another consequence is that a larger -reduction factor can typically be used with no price war effects in -scaled forward/reverse auction than in -scaled forward auction. As a result, fewer -scaling phases are typically needed in forward/reverse auction to deal effectively with price wars.
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Auction Algorithms for Asymmetric Assignment Problems
Reverse auction can be used in conjunction with forward auction to provide algorithms for solving the asymmetric assignment problem, where the number of objects n is larger than the number of persons m. Here we still require that each person be assigned to some object, but we allow objects to remain unassigned. As before, an assignment S is a (possibly empty) set of person-object pairs (i, j) such that j ∈ A(i) for all (i, j) ∈ S; for each person i there can be at most one pair (i, j) ∈ S;
and for every object j there can be at most one pair (i, j) ∈ S. The assignment S is said to be feasible if all persons are assigned under S.
The corresponding linear programming problem is
We can convert this program to the minimum cost flow problem
by replacing maximization by minimization, by reversing the sign of a ij , and by introducing a supersource node s, which is connected to each object node j by an arc (s, j) of zero cost and feasible flow range [0, ∞).
Using the duality theory for minimum cost network flow problems (see e.g. [BeT89] , p. 335, or
[Ber91], p. 35), it can be verified that the corresponding dual problem is
where we have converted maximization to minimization, we have used −π i in place of the price of each person node i, and we have denoted by λ the price of the supersource node s.
We now introduce an -CS condition for an assignment S and a pair (π, p).
Definition 2: An assignment S and a pair (π, p) are said to satisfy -CS if
The following proposition clarifies the significance of the preceding -CS condition.
Proposition 6: If a feasible assignment S satisfies the -CS conditions (20) together with a pair (π, p), then S is within m of being optimal for the asymmetric assignment problem. The triplet (π,p, λ), where
is within m of being an optimal solution of the dual problem (19).
Proof: For any feasible assignment {(i, k i ) | i = 1, . . . , m} and for any triplet (π, p, λ) satisfying the dual feasibility constraints πi + p j ≥ aij for all (i, j) ∈ A and λ ≤ p j for all j, we have
By maximizing over all feasible assignments {(i, ki) | i = 1, . . . , m} and by minimizing over all dual-feasible triplets (π, p, λ), we see that
where A * is the optimal assignment value and D * is the minimal dual cost.
Let now S = {(i, j i ) | i = 1, . . . , m} be the given assignment satisfying -CS together with (π, p), and consider the triplet (π,p, λ) defined by Eq. (21). Since for all i, we haveπi +pj i = aij + , we obtain
where the last inequality holds because the triplet (π,p, λ) is feasible for the dual problem. Since we showed earlier that A * ≤ D * , the desired conclusion follows. Q.E.D.
Consider now trying to solve the asymmetric assignment problem by means of auction. We can start with any assignment S and pair (π, p) satisfying the first two -CS conditions (20a) and (20b), and perform a forward auction (as defined earlier for the symmetric assignment problem) up to the point where each person is assigned to a distinct object. For a feasible problem, it can be seen that this will yield, in a finite number of iterations, a feasible assignment S satisfying the first two conditions (20a) and (20b). If we select initially all object prices to be zero, then upon termination of the algorithm, the prices of the unassigned objects will still be at zero, while the prices of the assigned objects will be nonnegative. Therefore the -CS condition (20c) will also be satisfied, and by Prop. 6, the assignment S obtained will be optimal. Unfortunately, the use of zero initial prices precludes the use of -scaling, and leaves the method susceptible to price wars. To be able to use -scaling we must be able to use arbitrary initial prices, but then the assignment S obtained by forward auction may not be optimal because the prices of the unassigned objects may not be minimal, that is, they may not satisfy the third -CS condition (20c). Roughly, what is happening here is that forward auction cannot resolve whether the objects that were left unassigned upon termination are intrinsically "undesirable" because they offer relatively low benefit to the persons, or whether they were left unassigned because their initial prices were high relative to the initial prices of the assigned objects.
To resolve this dilemma, we use a modified form of reverse auction to lower the prices of the objects that were left unassigned upon termination of the forward auction. After several reverse auction iterations in which persons may be reassigned to other objects, the third condition (20c) is satisfied. We will show that the assignment thus obtained satisfies all the -CS conditions (20a)- 
The typical iteration of modified reverse auction is the same as the one of reverse auction, except that only unassigned objects j with p j > λ participate in the auction. In particular, the algorithm maintains a feasible assignment S and a pair (π, p) satisfying Eqs. (20a) and (20b), and terminates when all unassigned objects j satisfy p j ≤ λ, in which case it will be seen that the third -CS condition (20c) will be satisfied as well. The scalar λ will be kept fixed throughout the algorithm.
Typical Iteration of Modified Reverse Auction for Asymmetric Assignment:
Select an object j that is unassigned under the assignment S, and satisfies pj > λ (if no such object can be found, the algorithm terminates). Find a "best" person ij such that ij = arg max i∈B(j) {aij − πi}, and the corresponding value
[If ij is the only person in B(j), we define ωj to be −∞.] If λ ≥ βj − , set pj := λ and go to the next iteration. Otherwise, let
Set
add to the assignment S the pair (ij, j), and remove from S the pair (ij, j ), where j is the object that was assigned to ij under S at the start of the iteration.
Note that the formula (25) for the bidding increment δ is such that the object j enters the assignment at a price which is no less than λ [and is equal to λ if and only if the minimum in Eq. (25) is attained by the first term]. Furthermore, we have δ ≥ (when δ is calculated, that is, when λ > β j − ), so it can be seen from Eqs. (26) and (27) that throughout the algorithm, prices are monotonically decreasing and profits are monotonically increasing. The following proposition establishes the validity of the method.
Proposition 7: The modified reverse auction algorithm for the asymmetric assignment problem terminates in a finite number of iterations and the assignment obtained is within m of being optimal.
Proof: In view of Prop. 6, the result will follow once we prove the following: 
so upon termination of the algorithm (necessarily with the prices of all unassigned objects less or equal to λ), the third -CS condition (20c) is satisfied.
(b) The algorithm terminates finitely.
We will prove these facts in sequence.
We assume that the conditions (20a), (20b), and (28) are satisfied at the start of an iteration, and we will show that they are also satisfied at the end of the iteration. First consider the case where there is no change in the assignment, which happens when λ ≥ β j − . Then Eqs. (20b), and (28) are automatically satisfied at the end of the iteration; only p j changes in the iteration according to
so the condition (20a) is also satisfied at the end of the iteration.
Next consider the case where there is a change in the assignment during the iteration. Let (π, p)
and (π, p) be the profit-price pair before and after the iteration, respectively, and let j and i j be the object and person involved in the iteration. By construction [cf. Eqs. (26) and (27)], we have πi j + p j = ai j j and since πi = πi and p k = p k for all i = ij and k = j, we see that the condition (20b) (π i + p k = a ik ) is satisfied for all assigned pairs (i, k) at the end of the iteration.
To show that the condition (20a) is satisfied at the end of the iteration, that is,
consider first objects k = j. Then, p k = p k and since π i ≥ π i for all i, the above condition holds, since at the start of the iteration, we have πi + p k ≥ a ik − for all (i, k). Consider next the case k = j. Then, condition (29) holds for i = i j , since π i j + p j = a i j j . Also using Eqs. (23)-(26) and the fact δ ≥ , we have for all i = i j ,
so condition (29) holds for i = i j and k = j, completing the proof.
To see that condition (28) is maintained by the iteration, note that by Eqs. (23), (24), and (26),
we have
Finally, to show that the algorithm terminates finitely, we note that in the typical iteration involving object j and person i j , there are two possibilities:
(1) The price of object j is set to λ without the object entering the assignment; this occurs if
(2) The profit of person i j increases by at least [this is seen from the definition (25) of δ; we have λ < βj − and βj ≥ ωj, so δ ≥ ].
Since only objects j with p j > λ can participate in the auction, possibility (1) can occur only a finite number of times. Thus, if the algorithm does not terminate, the profits of some persons will increase to ∞. This is impossible, since when person i is assigned to object j, we must have by Eqs.
(20b) and (28)
so the profits are bounded from above by max (i,j)∈A a ij − λ. Thus the algorithm must terminate finitely. Q.E.D.
As mentioned earlier, forward auction followed by modified reverse auction can start with arbitrary initial prices. As a result, one can use -scaling, performing a sequence of auctions with decreasing values of . This can be shown to improve the theoretical worst-case complexity of the method, and is often beneficial in practice, particularly for sparse problems. Out of several possible variations of the method, the one we found most effective is to use the modified reverse auction only in the last -scaling phase. In all other -scaling phases we use just forward auction.
Reverse auction can be used also to solve the variation of the two-sided inequality constrained assignment problem, where persons (as well as objects) need not be assigned if this degrades the assignment's value. This problem can be converted to an asymmetric assignment problem where all persons must be assigned by introducing for each person i an artificial object i and a zero cost arc (i, i ). One can then use the algorithm given earlier to solve this problem. The algorithm can be streamlined so that the calculations involving the artificial objects and arcs are handled efficiently.
AUCTION ALGORITHMS FOR MULTIASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS
An interesting type of assignment problem is described by the linear program
4. Auction Algorithms for Multiassignment Problems where m < n. For feasibility, we assume that the sets A(i) and B(j) are nonempty for all i and all j,
respectively. This is known as the multiassignment problem, and is characterized by the possibility of assignment of more than one object to a single person; such a person is said to be multiassigned.
Problems of this type arise in military applications such as multi-target tracking with sensors of limited resolution [Bla86] , where objects correspond to tracked vehicles and persons correspond to data points each representing at least one vehicle (but possibly more than one, because of the sensor's limited resolution). The multiassignment problem results when we try to associate data points with vehicles so as to match as closely as possible these data points with our prior knowledge of the vehicles' position.
We can convert the multiassignment problem to the minimum cost flow problem
by replacing maximization by minimization, by reversing the sign of aij, and by introducing a supersource node s, which is connected to each person node i by an arc (s, i) of zero cost and feasible flow range [0, ∞) (see Fig. 1 ).
Using duality theory again and appropriately redefining the price variables corresponding to the nodes, it can be verified that the corresponding dual problem is
Definition 3: A multiassignment S and a pair (π, p) are said to satisfy -CS if 
We have the following result.
Proposition 8: Assume that the benefits a ij are integer. If a feasible assignment S satisfies the -CS conditions (33) together with a pair (π, p) for < 1/m, then S is optimal for the multiassignment problem.
Proof: If S is not optimal, there must exist a cycle Y in the equivalent network of Fig. 1 with no repeated nodes along which the assignment S can be modified to result in a new feasible assignment S with improved primal cost. Assume for the moment that the supersource s is in the cycle; thus, let Y be Y = (s, i 1 , j 2 , i 2 , . . . , i k−1 , j k , i k , s).
In the above cycle, the nodes iq represent distinct persons, the nodes jq represent distinct objects and (iq, jq) ∈ S, jq ∈ A(iq−1), (iq−1, jq) / ∈ S, q = 2, . . . , k.
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Augmentation along Y results in replacing the pairs (i q , j q ) ∈ S, q = 2, . . . , k, by the pairs (i q−1 , j q ), q = 2, . . . , k, in the assignment. It can be seen that i k must be multiassigned prior to the augmentation; the reason is that with the augmentation along Y , the arc (i k , j k ) will exit the assignment, so person i k will be left unassigned and feasibility will be violated after the augmentation. Because Y has no repeated nodes, we have k ≤ m, which, based on the hypothesis, implies k < 1.
Since the augmentation results in strict cost improvement and the benefits are integer, we must (a i q−1 jq − p jq ).
Using the above relation and the -CS condition (33a), it follows that
From this relation, we obtain
This is a contradiction because we argued earlier that k < 1, and that i k is multiassigned, which
If Y does not contain s, a similar argument establishes the result. Q.E.D.
Consider now trying to solve the multiassignment problem by means of auction. We can start with any assignment S and profit-price pair (π, p) satisfying the first two -CS conditions (33a) and (33b), and perform a forward auction up to the point where each person is assigned to a (single) distinct object, while satisfying the conditions (33a) and (33b). However, this assignment will not be feasible, because some objects will still be unsassigned.
To make further progress, we use a modified reverse auction, which starts with the final results of the forward auction, that is, with an assignment S, where each person is assigned to a single distinct object, and with a pair (π, p) satisfying the first two -CS conditions (33a) and (33b). Let us denote by λ the maximal initial person profit,
The typical iteration, given below, is the same as the one of reverse auction, except that unassigned objects j that bid for a person may not necessarily displace the object assigned to the person but may 4. Auction Algorithms for Multiassignment Problems instead share the person with its already assigned object(s). In particular, the algorithm maintains an assignment S, for which each person is assigned to at least one object, and a pair (π, p) satisfying Eqs. (33a) and (33b); it terminates when all unassigned objects j have been assigned. It will be seen that upon termination, the third -CS condition (33c) will be satisfied as well. The scalar λ is kept fixed throughout the algorithm.
Typical Iteration of Modified Reverse Auction for Multiassignment:
Select an object j that is unassigned under the assignment S (if all objects are assigned, the algorithm terminates). Find a "best" person ij such that
[If ij is the only person in B(j), we define ωj to be −∞.] Let
Add (ij , j) to the assignment S, set
and if δ > 0, remove from the assignment S the pair (ij , j ), where j was assigned to ij under S.
Note that in an iteration, the number of assigned objects increases by one if and only if δ = 0
[which is equivalent to π i j = λ, since the second term β j − ω j + in Eq. (38) is always greater or equal to ]. The following proposition establishes the validity of the method.
Proposition 9:
The modified reverse auction algorithm for the multiassignment problem with integer benefits terminates in a finite number of iterations with an optimal assignment when < 1/m.
Proof: In view of Prop. 8, the result will follow once we prove the following: 
(b) The algorithm terminates finitely (necessarily with a feasible assignment).
To show (a) above, we use induction. In particular, we show that if the conditions (33) and (41) are satisfied at the start of an iteration, they are also satisfied at the end of the iteration. Indeed this is easily seen to be true for Eqs. (33a) and (33b). Equations (33c) and (41) are preserved since we have λ = max i=1,...,m π i at the start of the iteration and the only profit that changes is π i j , which by Eqs. (38) and (40) is set to something that is less or equal to λ, and is set to λ if and only if i j is multiassigned at the end of the iteration.
To show finite termination, we observe that a person i can receive a bid only a finite number of times after the profit π i is set to λ, since at each of these times the corresponding object will get assigned to i without any object already assigned to i becoming unassigned. On the other hand, by
Eqs. (38) and (40), at an iteration where a person i receives a bid, the profit π i is either set equal to λ or else increases by at least . Since profits are bounded above by λ throughout the algorithm, it follows that each person can receive only a finite number of bids, proving finite termination.
Q.E.D.
Two-Sided Multiassignment Problem
There are several variations of the multiassignment problem and the preceding algorithm. For example, the problem where is an upper bound αi on the number of objects person i can be assigned to, that is,
where αi are given integers. This multiassignment problem admits solution by a similar auction algorithm as the preceding one; we will not give the details.
Another interesting variation of the multiassignment problem arises when objects, as well as persons, can be multiassigned, up to a certain limit. This problem, referred to as two-sided multiassignment, can be written as maximize (i,j)∈A aijxij subject to
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where α j are given integers less. Note that if α j = 1, this problem is identical to the earlier problem (30).
Again, the above problem can be converted to a minimum cost network flow problem
by replacing maximization by minimization, by reversing the sign of a ij , by introducing a supersource node s with supply n − m, an arc (s, i) for each person i of zero cost and feasible flow range [0, ∞),
and an arc (j, s) for each object node j of zero cost and feasible flow range [0, α j − 1] (see Fig. 2 ).
Using duality theory and appropriately redefining the price variables corresponding to the nodes, it can be seen that the corresponding dual problem is
where λ is the dual price of the supersource node s. The above dual problem is similar to the earlier dual problem (32), with the exception of the cost terms introduced by the upper bounds on the arcs.
For the two-sided multiassignment problem, we introduce the following -CS condition for an assignment S and a pair (π, p):
A multiassignment S and a pair (π, p) are said to satisfy -CS for the two-sided multiassignment problem if 
if p j + λ > 0, j must be assigned to α j persons under S.
Using an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 8, we can establish the following result.
Proposition 10:
Assume that the benefits aij are integer. If a feasible assignment S satisfies the -CS conditions (46) together with a pair (π, p) for < 1/m, then S is optimal for the multiassignment problem.
Proof: If S is not optimal, there must exist a cycle Y in the equivalent network of Fig. 2 with no repeated nodes along which the assignment S can be modified to result in a new feasible assignment S with improved primal cost. There are five possible cases: 1) the cycle Y does not include node s; 2) the cycle Y includes s followed by a person and preceded by another person; 3) the cycle Y includes s followed by a person and preceded by an object; 4) the cycle Y includes s followed by an 4. Auction Algorithms for Multiassignment Problems object and preceded by a person; and 5) the cycle Y includes s followed by an object and preceded by another object.
Assume for the moment that the node s is in the cycle and that it is followed and preceded by persons (case 2); thus, let Y be
In order for augmentation along Y to result in a feasible assignment, we must have (i q , j q ) ∈ S, q = 2, . . . , k, j q+1 ∈ A(i q ), q = 1, . . . , k − 1; furthermore, i k must be multiassigned. Because Y has no repeated nodes, we have k ≤ m, which, based on the hypothesis, implies k < 1.
Augmentation along Y results in replacing the pairs (i q , j q ), q = 2, . . . , k, by the pairs (i q−1 , j q ), q = 2, . . . , k, in the assignment. Since following augmentation along Y , the primal cost is strictly improved, we must have (a i q−1 jq − p jq ).
Using this relation, and the -CS conditions (46a) and (46b), we obtain
This yields
which is a contradiction because k < 1, and
Similarly, assume that node s is preceded and followed by an object in Y (case 5); thus,
In order for augmentation along Y to produce a feasible assignment, we must have (i q , j q ) ∈ S, q = 1, . . . , k, j q+1 ∈ A(i q ), q = 1, . . . , k − 1; furthermore, we must have (i q−1 , j q ) / ∈ S, q = 2, . . . , k +1, j1 must be multiassigned, and j k+1 must be assigned to less than αj k+1 persons. Because Y has no repeated nodes, we have k ≤ m, which, based on the hypothesis, implies k < 1.
Augmentation along Y results in replacing the pairs (i q , j q ), q = 1, . . . , k by the pairs (i q , j q+1 ), q = 1, . . . , k, in the assignment; note that since j 1 is multiassigned and j k+1 can be assigned to at least one more person, the resulting modified assignment is feasible. Thus, we must have (a iq j q+1 − π iq ).
Using the above relation and the -CS conditions (46a) and (46b), we obtain
This yields 1 − k ≤ p j k+1 − p j 1 , which is a contradiction because k < 1, while by the CS conditions (46d) and (46e), we have p i k+1 = −λ ≤ p j 1 , since j k+1 is assigned to less than α k+1 persons.
The proof for cases 1, 3, and 4 is similar. Q.E.D.
Consider now trying to solve the two-sided multiassignment problem using an auction algorithm.
We start from any assignment S that has at most one person assigned to each object and at most one object assigned to each person, and a profit-price pair (π, p) satisfying the first two -CS conditions associated with regular auction [cf. Eqs. (20a), (20b)]. We then use a forward auction algorithm up to the point where each person is assigned to a single (distinct) object, while satisfying the first two -CS conditions (46a) and (46b) [condition (46b) will actually be satisfied with equality]. Note that this assignment will not be feasible since m < n.
At this point, we switch to using a modified reverse auction; denote by λ the maximal initial person profit
Using this value of λ, we can determine which objects have prices p j indicating that they can be multiassigned; in particular, the -CS condition (46e) suggest that any object with price p j greater than −λ should be assigned to as many persons as possible. In order to determine these persons, we use a reverse auction where each unassigned object, and each assigned object with price p j greater than −λ and assigned to less than α j persons will bid to be assigned to an additional person. This reverse auction is modified in order to satisfy the -CS conditions at termination, as follows:
Typical Iteration of Modified Reverse Auction for Two-Sided Multiassignment:
Select an object j that is unassigned, or is assigned to at least one and less than αj persons, and has pj greater than −λ (if no such object can be found, the algorithm terminates). If the set {i ∈ B(j) | (i, j) / ∈ S} is empty, set pj = −λ and go to the next iteration. Otherwise, find a "best" person ij such that ij = arg max
[If the set i ∈ B(j), i = ij, (i, j) / ∈ S is empty, we define ωj to be −∞.]
If j is unassigned, let
If j is assigned to at least one and less than αj persons, and pj + λ > 0, let
and distinguish two cases:
(a) δ < βj + λ: In this case, add (ij, j) to the assignment S, set
and if δ > 0, remove from S the pair (ij, j ), where j was assigned to ij under S.
(b) δ = βj + λ: In this case, set
and, if δ > 0, add (ij, j) to the assignment S and remove from S the pair (ij, j ), where j was assigned to ij under S.
Note that the above algorithm uses two types of iterations. The first type occurs when the bidding object is unassigned; then the number of unassigned objects decreases by one when δ is zero, which is equivalent to π i = λ, so that person i can be multiassigned. The second type of iteration occurs when the bidding object is already assigned, but has price p j > −λ; then either j is assigned to an additional person, or else p j is reduced to the threshold price −λ.
The following proposition establishes the validity of the method.
Proposition 11:
The modified reverse auction algorithm for the two-sided multiassignment problem with integer benefits terminates in a finite number of iterations with an optimal assignment when < 1/m.
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Proof: In view of Prop. 10, the result will follow once we prove the following:
(a) The modified reverse auction iteration preserves the -CS conditions (46a-d).
(c) Upon termination, the -CS condition (46e) must be satisfied.
To show (a) above, we use induction. Let (π, p) and (π, p) be the profit-price pair before and after an iteration of the modified reverse auction algorithm, respectively, and let j and i j be the object and person involved in the iteration. At the beginning of the first iteration, S and (π, p)
By construction, we also have
furthermore, every person is assigned to exactly one object, and every object is assigned to at most one person. Thus, the -CS conditions (46a-d) are satisfied.
Assume that the -CS conditions (46a-d) are satisfied at the beginning of an iteration. We consider three cases: a) object j is currently unassigned, b) object j is assigned and the bid increment δ satisfies δ < β j + λ, and c) object j is assigned and the bid increment δ satisfies δ = β j + λ.
In case (a), by construction we have
Furthermore, since π i j does not decrease, the -CS condition (46a) will be satisfied for all k ∈ A(i j ), k = j. In addition, for any i = i j , i ∈ B(j), we have by Eq. (50)
establishing that the -CS conditions (46a,b) are satisfied at the end of the iteration. In addition, the -CS condition (46c) is guaranteed to be satisfied by Eqs. (51a,c) , and the -CS condition (46d)
continues to be satisfied, since the prices of multiassigned objects were not affected.
In case (b), the price p j , and the profits π i j and π i , (i, j) ∈ S are modified. Conditions (46c,d)
will be satisfied by the modified profits and prices at the end of the iteration by construction [cf.
Eq. (52a-d)]. Assume δ = β j − ω j + ; then −λ ≤ ω j − , so
establishing that the -CS condition (46b) holds for the new pair (ij, j) entering the assignment.
Similarly, the -CS condition (46b) is satisfied for all (i, j) ∈ S by construction [cf. Eq. (52d)]. Since p j ≤ p j , Eq. (52d) implies that π i ≤ π i for all i, which in turn implies that the -CS condition (46a) is satisfied for all k ∈ A(i), with (i, k) / ∈ S and (i, j) ∈ S. Also, the -CS condition (46a) is satisfied for all (i, j) / ∈ S, i = ij because Eq. (50) implies
If on the other hand, δ = λ − π i , then a i j j ≥ 0 and ω j − ≤ a i j j − λ. Thus, Eq. (46b) is satisfied for (i j , j) at the end of the iteration, since
Similarly, the -CS condition (46b) is satisfied for all (i, j) ∈ S by Eq. (52d). Since pj + λ > 0, pj is not increased during the iteration. Thus, Eq. (52d) implies that π i ≤ π i for all i, so that the -CS condition (46a) is satisfied for all k ∈ A(i), with (i, k) / ∈ S, and (i, j) ∈ S. Furthermore, since
In case (c), assume δ = βj + λ > 0. Then, the -CS condition (46b) is satisfied for the pair (ij, j) because π i j j + p j = a i j j − β j + max{0, δ} − λ = a i j j .
By assumption, the iteration decreases the price p j and increases the profit π i j . Furthermore, Eq.
(53c) implies that the profits πi ≤ πi for all i, so that the -CS condition (46a) is satisfied for all (i, k) ∈ A, (i, k) / ∈ S, (i, j) ∈ S. Equation (53c) also guarantees that the -CS condition (46b) will be satisfied at the end of the iteration. If δ ≤ 0, the assignment S is not modified; only the price p j is decreased and the profits π i , (i, j) ∈ S are modified. The -CS condition (46b) is satisfied because of Eq. (53c); in addition, the -CS condition (46a) is satisfied because
and the profits π i , i ∈ B(j) are nondecreasing.
The above arguments establish that the -CS conditions (46a-d) are preserved by each modified reverse auction iteration. To complete the proof, we must show that the algorithm terminates finitely, and that at termination, the -CS condition (46e) is satisfied. It is easy to verify that the number of assigned pairs is nondecreasing, and, as shown above, the profits π i are nondecreasing, while the prices p j are nonincreasing. Furthermore, each iteration is guaranteed to produce one (or more) of the following three outcomes: a) at least one profit πi increases, b) one additional pair 4. Auction Algorithms for Multiassignment Problems is assigned, and c) S remains unchanged, but the price p j is set to the minimum value −λ. By construction, the profits πi cannot rise above λ; furthermore, the prices pj can only be reduced to −λ once per object, and there is a finite maximum number of assigned pairs, which establishes finite termination. To show that the -CS condition (46e) is satisfied at termination, note that iterations occur until this condition is satisfied. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we present some numerical results on the computational performance of the new auction algorithms described in the previous sections. The algorithms have been implemented in FORTRAN and have been compared with state-of-the-art algorithms for every class of problems considered in this paper.
Symmetric Assignment Problems
We first tested the two versions of forward/reverse auction (a scaled and an unscaled version) applied to symmetric assignment problems versus two other state-of-the-art codes: a forward auction code, and the code of Jonker and Volgenant [JoV87] . The latter, abbreviated as JV code, consists of two phases: an initialization phase, which is based on the naive auction algorithm (the forward auction algorithm with = 0), and a sequential shortest path method phase, which assigns the persons that are left unassigned by the initialization phase. It is widely believed that though the combination of the auction and the sequential shortest path algorithms, the JV code is substantially faster than the best pure sequential shortest path and Hungarian assignment codes (for some comparative evidence see [Ber90] ).
Our results for symmetric assignment problems are summarized in Figs. 3-6 , where each data point represents an average over ten to thirty random problems with identical characteristics. In
Figs. 3-6, a different characteristic (number of nodes, average node degree, and benefit range) of the problem was allowed to vary: the number of nodes in Fig. 3 , the average node degree in and fully dense problems, respectively. It can be seen that the unscaled forward/reverse auction is running considerably faster than the other codes. The auction algorithms (remarkably, including the unscaled forward/reverse algorithm) are also quite insensitive to the benefit range; a similar 4. Auction Algorithms for Multiassignment Problems conclusion regarding scaled forward auction was reached in [WeZ91] . Furthermore, all the auction codes run much faster than the JV code except when the problem is quite dense (cf. Fig. 4 when the number of arcs is large). Still even for fully dense problems the unscaled forward/reverse algorithm is faster than the JV code, except when the benefit range is relatively small ([0,100] in Fig. 6 ).
There is an explanation for the excellent performance of the JV code for a fully dense problem with a small benefit range. What happens here is that the problem is solved essentially in the naive auction initialization phase of the code and the sequential shortest path phase plays no role. Thus, in this case, the JV code behaves like a very efficient auction algorithm. In the test problems of Figs. 3-6 the arc benefits are uniformly distributed over the benefit range.
In Fig. 7 we tested the effect of a two-level arc benefit distribution on the performance of the auction algorithms. Here 80% of the arcs are drawn from the benefit range [0,100] and 20% of the arcs have benefit 100000. Such arc benefit distributions are generally considered "difficult" for auction algorithms since they tend to stimulate price wars. As mentioned earlier, forward/reverse auction tends to resolve price wars faster than forward auction, and this advantage is manifested dramatically in the results of Fig. 7 for the difficult problems. It should be noted that, in the difficult problem experiments in Fig. 7 , the scaling parameters of forward auction were optimized. This optimization resulted in an improvement of roughly a factor of 6 in run time over the codes with the default scaling parameters given in [Ber91] .
Except on artificially constructed examples, we have found the performance of unscaled forward/reverse auction remarkably robust. Indeed, it is only in very special classes of problems that the performance of this algorithm is significantly hampered by the occurrence of price wars. The paper [Cas92] provides a comprehensive computational study of the performance and the robustness of the forward/reverse algorithms for a variety of problem structures.
Asymmetric Assignment Problems
The new forward/reverse auction algorithm for asymmetric one-on-one assignment problems was tested versus the asymmetric version of the JV algorithm. We performed tests with two types of randomly generated problems. For both classes of problems, each person node has 10 incident arcs.
However, in the first class of problems, the end nodes of the arcs, and the arc benefits were generated in a completely random fashion. Figure 8 gives the running times of the the scaled forward reverse auction algorithm, the unscaled auction algorithm, and the JV code for this class of problems. A comparison of this figure with Fig. 3 indicates that this class of problems is relatively "easy" for all methods. In particular, price wars were very infrequent, and the unscaled auction algorithm outperformed its scaled version as well as the JV code by a large margin.
The second class of asymmetric assignment problems was specially designed to create price wars by making some nodes difficult to assign. In particular, we introduced two levels of arc benefits that are different by approximately three orders of magnitude. This kind of bipartite problems is quite typical in many applications where nearly infeasible problems frequently arise, e.g. in target tracking applications where potentially false measurements or tracks cannot be matched to confirmed targets. the number of arcs, but the scaled auction algorithm outperforms the unscaled one by an almost constant factor of 25. The run time of the JV algorithm grows almost quadratically as it did for symmetric problems. The performance of scaled auction is significantly better than that of the JV algorithm, but unscaled auction is worse than JV in these experiments. Note, however, that our unscaled auction for asymmetric assignment problems does not involve a reverse portion. The initial object prices in all runs were 0, and as mentioned in Section 3, upon termination of the forward auction part of the code, all the -CS conditions are satisfied, and the reverse auction part is never used. Thus the mechanism that helped the forward/reverse unscaled auction algorithm to avoid price wars in the difficult problems of Fig. 7 algorithm for the difficult problems of Fig. 9 .
Multiassignment Problems
Next, we tested the multiassignment auction algorithm (abbreviated multiauction) for one-sided asymmetric problems versus the state-of-the-art relaxation code RELAX [BeT88] , which solves the equivalent minimum cost network flow problems, and versus the state-of-the-art primal-simplex code NETFLO due to Kennington and Helgason [KeH80] , which solves the same equivalent network flow problems. We do not know of any specialized assignment code (including the Hungarian or mixed auction/Hungarian code such as JV) than can be easily modified to handle multiassignment problems. It was found that the NETFLO run times were approximately 40 times higher than those of RELAX for about 5000 arcs and that factor was growing for higher numbers of arcs. In Fig. 10 we show the solution times versus the number of arcs for RELAX and the new multiassignment algorithm for a sequence of randomly generated asymmetric problems with a fixed number of arcs per node. The run times for multiauction grow almost linearly as the number of arcs increases, and this behavior is very consistent across all runs. Furthermore, multiauction is approximately 4 times faster than RELAX, whose run times also grow roughly linearly but with quite a bit more fluctuation.
Scaling is important for multiassignment problems as it is for one-on-one assignment problems.
Although this may not be apparent for randomly generated problems, it is frequently needed in asymmetric one-on-one assignment problems randomly generated 10 arcs per node 
